Jurisdictions are in the process of establishing regulatory  systems to control  green-
house gas emissions. Short-term and  sometimes long-term emissions reduction goals are established,
as California does for 2020 and 2050,  but little attention has yet been focused on annual
emissions targets for the intervening years. We develop recommendations for  how   these  annual
targets—which we  collectively term  a “compliance pathway”—can be set, as well as what flexibility
sources should have to  adjust in  light  of  cost  uncertainties. Environmental  effectiveness,
efficiency, equity, adaptability, and  encouraging global participation are appropriate criteria by
which these  intertemporal policy  alternatives should be judged.  Limited but useful knowledge
about costs  leads us to recommend a compliance pathway char- acterized  by increasing incremental
reductions along it. This can be approximated by  discrete   linear   segments,  which  may   fit  
better   with  global   negotiations. Although the above conclusion applies to any long-term GHG
regulatory  program, many jurisdictions will rely heavily  on a cap-and-trade system, and the same 
path- way recommendation applies  to its time  schedule of allowances. Furthermore, borrowing
constraints in cap-and-trade systems can impose substantial unneces- sary costs.  To avoid  most of
these  costs,  we recommend that  sources be allowed early use  of limited percentages  of
allowances intended for future years.  We also find  that  a three-year  compliance period  can 
have  substantial benefit  over a one- year period.  © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy
Analysis and Management.

This paper shows that insecurity of property rights over agricultural land can have large efficiency and equity costs because of the way it affects matching in the tenancy market. A principal-agent framework is used to model the landlord’s decision to rent when he takes into account the risk of losing the land to the tenant and when contract enforcement is decreasing in social distance with the tenant. These effects are quantified for the case of local land rental markets in the Dominican Republic. Results show that insecure property rights lead to matching in the tenancy market along socio-economic lines, severely limiting the size of the rental market and the choice of tenants for landlords, both with efficiency costs. Social segmentation reduces access to land for the rural poor, with high equity costs. Simulations suggest that improving tenure security would increase rental transactions by 21% and the area rented to the poor by 63%. Increased property rights security is hence beneficial not only to asset owners, but also to those with whom they might interact in the market.

2010 marks the 50th anniversary of California’s famed Master Plan for Higher Education, arguably the single most influential effort to plan the future of a system of higher education in the annals of American higher education. This essay builds on the analysis offered in a previous CSHE research paper (“From Chaos to Order and Back”) by discussing the major challenges facing California’s higher education system, and offering a possibly pathway to reforms and institution-building essential for bolstering socioeconomic mobility and greater economic competitiveness. Most critics and observers of California’s system remain focused on incremental and largely marginal improvements, transfixed by the state’s persistent financial problems and inability to engage in long-range planning for a population that is projected to grow from approximately 37 million to some 60 million by 2050. President Obama has set a national goal for the US to once again have among the highest educational attainment rates in the world. This would require the nation to produce over 8 million additional degrees; California’s “fair share” would be approximately 1 million additional degrees. A number of studies indicate that California’s higher education system will not keep pace with labor needs in the state, let alone affording opportunities for socioeconomic mobility that once characterized California. California needs to re-imagine its once vibrant higher education system. The objective is to offer a vision of a more mature system of higher education that could emerge over the next twenty years; in essence, a logical next stage in a system that has hardly changed in the last five decades. Informed by the history of the tripartite system, its strengths and weaknesses over time, and the reform efforts of economic competitors throughout the world who are making significant investments in their own tertiary institutions, I offer a “re-imagined” network of colleges and universities and a plan for “Smart Growth.” I paint a picture that builds on California’s existing institutions, predicated on a more diverse array of institutional types, and rooted in the historical idea of mission differentiation. This includes setting educational attainment goals for the state; shifting more students to 4-year institutions including UC and CSU; reorganizing the California Community Colleges to include a set of 4-year institutions, another set of “Transfer Focused” campuses, and having these colleges develop a “gap” year program for students out of high school to better prepare for higher education. It also encompasses creating a new Polytechnic University sector, a new California Open University that is primarily focused on adult learners; and developing a new funding model that recognizes the critical role of tuition, and the market for international students that can generate income for higher education and attract top talent to California. There is also a need to recognize that for the US to increase degree attainment rates, the federal government will need to become a more engaged partner with the states. For the near and possibly long-term, most state governments are in a fiscally weakened position that makes any large-scale investment in expanding access improbable. Because of the size of its population alone, California is the canary in the coal mine. If the US is to make major strides toward President Obama’s goal, it cannot do it without California.

Objective The purpose of this paper was to examine the patterns of spending, price, and the utilization of ADHD medications during the 10-year period, from1994 to 2003 among 4 different per capita GDP group countries.

Methods This study used the IMS Health database and included both branded and generic ADHD medications. We examined the changes in quantity and price as well as the mixed effects of these changes in the U.S.A. and 3 other groups of countries classified according to their level of per capita GDP.

Results During this study (1994–2003), the U.S. expenditures for ADHD medications increased 594%; sales volume rose by 80%; and price increased by 285%. In other high GDP countries, expenditures increased 493%, sales volume 328%, and price increased by 39%. In the middle GDP countries, expenditures increased 164%, sales volume 141%, and price increased by 9%. In the countries with a lower per capita GDP, expenditures increased 149%, sales volume 464%, however price decreased by 37%.

Conclusions The launch of long-acting ADHD medications has dramatically increased the total medication expenditure in the U.S. as well as in other high GDP markets. In the other countries quantity was the most important growth factor.

Of the 1.65 million lawsuits enforcing federal laws over the past decade, 3 percent were prosecuted by the federal government, while 97 percent were litigated by private parties. When and why did private plaintiff-driven litigation become a dominant model for enforcing federal regulation? The Litigation State shows how government legislation created the nation's reliance upon private litigation, and investigates why Congress would choose to mobilize, through statutory design, private lawsuits to implement federal statutes. Sean Farhang argues that Congress deliberately cultivates such private lawsuits partly as a means of enforcing its will over the resistance of opposing presidents.

Farhang reveals that private lawsuits, functioning as an enforcement resource, are a profoundly important component of American state capacity. He demonstrates how the distinctive institutional structure of the American state--particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy--encourages Congress to incentivize private lawsuits. Congress thereby achieves regulatory aims through a decentralized army of private lawyers, rather than by well-staffed bureaucracies under the president's influence. The historical development of ideological polarization between Congress and the president since the late 1960s has been a powerful cause of the explosion of private lawsuits enforcing federal law over the same period.

Using data from many policy areas spanning the twentieth century, and historical analysis focused on civil rights, The Litigation State investigates how American political institutions shape the strategic design of legislation to mobilize private lawsuits for policy implementation.