The classic model of Becker (1965) suggests that labor supply decisions should be analyzed within the broader context of time allocation and market good consumption choices, but most empirical work on policy has focused exclusively on measuring impacts on market work. This paper examines how income taxes affect time allocation during the entire day, and how these time allocation decisions interact with expenditure patterns. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1975 to 2004, we analyze the response of single women's housework, labor supply, and other time to variation in tax and transfer schedules across income levels, number of children, states, and time. We find that when the economic reward to participating in the labor force increases, market work increases and housework decreases, with the decrease in housework accounting for approximately two-thirds of the increase in market work. Analysis of repeated cross-sections of time diary data from 1975 to 2004 shows that "home production" decreases substantially when market hours of work increase in response to policy changes. Data on expenditures show some evidence that expenditures on market goods likely to substitute for housework increase in response to a greater incentive to join the labor force. The baseline estimates imply that the elasticity of substitution between consumption of home and market goods is 2.61. The results are consistent with the Becker model. Meanwhile, single men show little response to changes in tax policy, and we are able to rule out an elasticity of substitution between home and market goods for this group of more than 1.66.

Politically active individuals and organizations make huge investments of time, energy, and money to influence everything from election outcomes to congressional subcommittee hearings to local school politics, while other groups and individual citizens seem woefully underrepresented in our political system. The Unheavenly Chorus is the most comprehensive and systematic examination of political voice in America ever undertaken—and its findings are sobering.

Many governments in the United States hold elections on days other than national Election Day. Recent studies have argued that the low voter turnout that accompanies such off-cycle elections could create an advantage for interest groups. However, the endogeneity of election timing makes it difficult to estimate its causal effect on political outcomes. In this paper, I develop a theoretical framework that explains how changes to election timing affect the electoral fortunes of organized interest groups. I test the theory by examining the effects of a 2006 Texas law that forced approximately 20 percent of the state’s school districts to move their elections to the same day as national elections. Using matching as well as district fixed effects regression, I estimate the causal effect of the switch to on-cycle election timing on district teacher salaries, since teachers and their unions tend to be the dominant interest group in school board elections. I find that school districts that were forced to switch to on-cycle elections responded by granting significantly lower salary raises to teachers, supporting the hypothesis that school trustees were less responsive to the dominant interest group after the switch.

Four years after the beginning of the Great Recession, the labor market remains historically weak. Many observers have concluded that "structural" impediments to recovery bear some of the blame. The author reviews such structural explanations, but after analyzing U.S. data on unemployment and productivity, he finds there is little evidence supporting these hypotheses. He finds that the bulk of the evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that continued poor performance is primarily attributable to shortfalls in the aggregate demand for labor.

The Great Recession generated large reductions in employment, earnings, he Great Recession generated large reductions in employment, earnings, and income for workers and families in the United States. The seasonally and income for workers and families in the United States. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate increased from 5 percent in December 2007 to adjusted unemployment rate increased from 5 percent in December 2007 to 9.5 percent in June 2009, the start and end of the recession according to the National 9.5 percent in June 2009, the start and end of the recession according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. From 2007 to 2010, median real family income fell by 6 percent and the poverty rate 2007 to 2010, median real family income fell by 6 percent and the poverty rate increased from 12.5 percent to 15.1 percent (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith increased from 12.5 percent to 15.1 percent (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2011). The recovery since June 2009 has been slow relative to historical averages. 2011). The recovery since June 2009 has been slow relative to historical averages. In the more than two and a half years since the offi cial start of the recovery, the In the more than two and a half years since the offi cial start of the recovery, the unemployment rate has fallen by just over a percentage point, reaching 8.3 percent unemployment rate has fallen by just over a percentage point, reaching 8.3 percent in February 2012. The effects of the Great Recession, however, are not experienced in February 2012. The effects of the Great Recession, however, are not experienced equally by all workers. National statistics can obscure dramatic differences in the equally by all workers. National statistics can obscure dramatic differences in the severity of the cyclical impacts for different groups. For example, men experienced severity of the cyclical impacts for different groups. For example, men experienced signifi cantly larger job loss in the Great Recession compared to women, but during signifi cantly larger job loss in the Great Recession compared to women, but during the recovery, male employment is picking up more rapidly (Kochhar 2011). the recovery, male employment is picking up more rapidly (Kochhar 2011).