For-profit colleges and universities in the US have been growing at a staggering pace in enrollment, in profits, and in the corporate value of those traded on the New York Stock Exchange. From 2000 to 2010, the sector grew by some 235 percent in enrollment, increasing its market share from 3 to 9.1 percent of all tertiary enrolled students. What accounts for this rapid growth in the For-Profit (FP) sector in the US? How will such growth influence educational opportunity and degree attainment rates in a country that first pioneered a mass higher education built largely around expanding public colleges and universities? As discussed in the following essay, there are specific characteristics of the FP sector that are peculiar to the US; others reflect global trends largely seen in developing economies. Simply put, in the US as in other parts of the world, the FP sector is a modern feature of changing market dynamics related to demand and supply – or the lack thereof. As discussed in this essay, the current US experience is a version of what I call the “Brazilian Effect”: when public higher education cannot keep pace with growing public demand for access and programs, governments often allow FP’s to rush in and help fill the gap, becoming a much larger and sometimes dominant provider. This is the pattern in many developing economies such as Brazil where some 50 percent of student enrollment is in profit-like private institutions also found in Korea, Poland and many other parts of the world. Despite concerns about the economic model of For-Profits which rely heavily on taxpayer funds, their low degree completion rates, the quality of those degrees, their high tuition and fee levels, the high levels of debt and poor employment record of graduates, and new federal regulations and a series of lawsuits, my prediction is that the FP sector will continue to grow over the long-term not so much because it meets societal demands for diverse forms of higher education, but because of the inability of the public sector to return to the levels of public subsidies and program growth they had in the past – the Brazilian Effect. The result now, and in the future, is a kind of policy default: the future tertiary market will not be the result of a well thought out policy at the national or state levels, but a quasi-free market result that will foster lower quality providers and fail to meet national goals for increasing the educational attainment level of Americans. As this paper discusses, higher education policy is about broad issues of socioeconomic mobility and economic competitiveness, but it is also about money, big business, and political influence.

In this critical analysis, I interrogate the efforts of elite education reformers to cast market-based school choice reforms as descendants of civil rights movement policies. Drawing from multidisciplinary research, including educational policy, history, and sociology, as well as the voices of contemporary educational reformers, I examine the ideological underpinnings and demographic profile of the market-based school reform movement. In turn, I juxtapose these elite stances and initiatives with grassroots organizing in traditionally marginalized communities and argue that it is the latter which yokes their efforts to issues of justice, equity, and voice and are far more deeply connected to the ongoing struggle for civil rights and social justice. I conclude that civil rights claims in support of market-based choice reforms are a seductive attempt to recast civil rights concerns primarily at the individual rather than at the community level and therefore fail to map onto broader social and educational justice concerns that animate alternative grassroots organizing.

One sees various efforts in developed as well as in developing economies to seek a greater participation of lower‐income students in their nation's leading universities. Once lower‐income students do enroll in a highly selective institution, what happens to them? How well do they do academically when compared to their more wealthy counterparts? How integrated are they into the academic community and in their satisfaction with their choice and sense of support by the institution and fellow students? These are crucial questions, if and when élite universities in various parts of the world become more representative of their general population; the stated desire of most of these institution, virtually all of which are nationally funded entities that must justify their public subsidies. This paper explores the divide between poor and rich students, first comparing a group of selective US institutions and their number and percentage of Pell Grant recipients and then, using institutional data and results from the University of California, Student Experience in the Research University Survey (SERU Survey), presenting an analysis of the high percentage of low‐income undergraduate students within the University of California system; who they are, their academic performance and quality of their undergraduate experience.

Examining qualitative historical evidence from cases of federal regulation in the areas of labor, civil rights, and environmental policy, this paper provides support for the hypothesis that divergence between legislative and executive preferences – a core and distinctive feature of the American constitutional order – creates an incentive for Congress to rely upon private lawsuits, as an alternative to administrative power, to achieve its regulatory goals. It also shows that this mechanism encouraging statutory mobilization of private litigants had been operative long before its powerful growth started in the late 1960s; that it operates in similar fashion with Republican legislators facing Democratic presidents, and Democratic legislators facing Republican presidents; and that it remained a source of controversy, and an active influence on congressional decision-making, throughout the half century covering the 1940s through the 1980s.

We estimate the effect of changes in incarceration rates on changes in crime rates using state-level panel data. We develop an instrument for future changes in incarceration rates based on the theoretically predicted dynamic adjustment path of the aggregate incarceration rate in response to a shock to prison entrance or exit transition probabilities. Given that incarceration rates adjust to permanent changes in behavior with a dynamic lag, one can identify variation in incarceration rates that is not contaminated by contemporary changes in criminal behavior. For the period 1978-2004, we find crime-prison elasticities that are considerably larger than those implied by ordinary least squares estimates. We also present results for two sub-periods: 1978-90 and 1991-2004. Our instrumental variables estimates for the earlier period suggest relatively large crime-prison effects. For the later time period, however, the effects of changes in incarceration rates on crime rates are much smaller.