We first provide a brief critique of the utilitarian principle as a guide to fairness in the world trading system. We then turn to the alternative conception of fairness in terms of economic equity, exploring the meaning of its two components: equality of opportunity and distributive justice. We thereafter proceed to discuss the conditions of autonomy and reciprocity that have to be met in order to realize greater fairness in multilateral trade negotiations. Next, we comment on aspects of procedural justice that are necessary for the functioning of a fair trading system. Finally, we conclude with an overall assessment of the considerations of the fairness achieved in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations and implications for conclusion of the Doha Round.

The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to commercialize their research. University laboratories therefore have two sources of funds: direct grants from the government and funds from commercialization. In addition to giving direct subsidies to university laboratories,
the government also subsidizes the commercial sector, for example, through tax credits.
Subsidies to commerce contribute indirectly to the university's research budget, because
they increase the prot from commercialization. This paper investigates the optimal mix
of direct and indirect subsidies to the university, in a context where the role of university
research is to turn up \ideas" for commercial investments, and the role of commerce is to
turn the ideas into innovations. It also asks whether there is an argument for protecting
\ideas" as well as commercializations, as is authorized by the Bayh-Dole Act.

We study insurance against common shocks in cooperatives and other productive
groups of individuals. In those groups, and due to strategic interactions among
group members, insurance decisions may be preferably taken at the group level
rather than the individual level. We highlight two kinds of potential problems with
individual insurance : the first one is a free-riding problem because due to strategic
interactions, insurance decisions exert a positive externality on other group members
; the second one is a coordination problem that occurs because it may be unprotable
for an individual to take insurance if the others in the group do not. Both types of
problems can be resolved if insurance is oered at the group level.

We investigate optimal rewards in an R&D model where substitute ideas for innovation arrive to random recipients at random times. By foregoing investment in a current idea, society as a whole preserves an option to invest in a better idea for the same market niche, but with delay. Because successive ideas may occur to different people, there is a conflict between private and social optimality. We investigate the optimal policy when the social planner learns over time about the arrival rate of ideas, and when private recipients of ideas can bank their ideas for future use. We argue that private incentives to create socially valuable options can be achieved by giving higher rewards where "ideas are scarce."

Emissions taxes and carbon caps can both lead to efficient production of energy,
in the sense of controlling carbon emissions to the extent that is efficient with
existing technologies. However, the regulatory policy has a second objective,
which is to create incentives to develop lower-carbon technologies. With both
objectives in mind, does one policy dominate the other? The answer depends
partly on whether the regulated price of energy is in the elastic or inelastic part
of the demand curve. It also depends on the size of the improvement. Under
tax regulation, an innovator can always profit from diffusing the clean technology
to all producers. This is not true under a carbon cap because diffusion
expands energy supply, reducing the price of energy and of allowances and
eroding the producers’ willingness to pay for licenses. Under cap-and-trade
regulation, the regulator has less ability to control the price of energy while
ensuring productive efficiency (full diffusion). Because there is little incentive
to invest in a larger improvement than will be fully diffused, cap-and-trade
regulation limits innovation in a way that is avoided by a tax.

Many observers are skeptical of claims that private entrepreneurs can perform traditional governmental functions like supporting basic research, keeping WMD away from terrorists, or protecting public health. This article presents five recent counterexamples. These include initiatives designed to establish new health and safety standards in nanotechnology; build a central repository for worldwide mutations data; use on-line volunteers to find cures for tuberculosis; and require biotech companies to screen customer orders for products that can be used to make weapons. In principle, many more initiatives are both possible and desirable. Historically, however, government done little to promote private initiatives and sometimes destabilized them. The article suggests strategies for this overcoming this problem.

WMD technologies are increasingly available from commercial firms located all over the world. Scholars point out that traditional political initiatives based on regulation and treaty will have difficulty controlling this complex environment. By comparison, market forces routinely impose uniform, worldwide standards (e.g. Windows software, Blu-Ray video players) in many high tech industries. Recently, the companies in one such industry (artificial DNA) used these same economic forces to develop and implement a biosecurity standard. Surprisingly, the resulting standard is more stringent – and at least arguably more enforceable – than the US government’s own official guidelines. This article begins by presenting a short history of how private and public standards evolved in the artificial DNA industry. It then goes beyond this motivating example to ask whether we can expect private non-proliferation standards to be similarly effective in other industries. Next, it reviews what modern theories have to say about standard-setting in both government and the private sector. This analysis suggests that private standards should be reasonably feasible, stringent, and enforceable for many dual use industries. Furthermore, theory suggests that private standards will often reflect society’s risk preferences at least as well as public regulation. The article concludes by suggesting specific reforms for improving private and public standards-setting still further.

We consider group formation with asymmetric information. Agents have unverifiable
characteristics as well as the verifiable qualifications required for memberships in groups.
The characteristics can be chosen, such as strategies in games, or can be learned, such
as skills required for jobs. They can also be innate, such as intelligence. We assume that
the unverifiable characteristics are observable ex post (after groups have formed) in the
sense that they may affect the output and utility of other agents in the group. They are
not verifiable ex ante, which means that prices for memberships cannot depend on them,
and they cannot be used for screening members. The setup includes problems as diverse
as moral hazard in teams, screening on ability, and mechanism design. Our analysis,
including the definition of equilibrium and existence, revolves around the randomness
in matching. We characterize the limits on efficiency in such a general equilibrium, and
show that a sufficiently rich set of group types can ensure the existence of an efficient
equilibrium.