We develop a simple cross-sectional research design to identify causal effects that is robust to unobservable heterogeneity. When many observational units are dense in physical space, it may be sufficient to regress the “spatial first differences” (SFD) of the outcome on the treatment and omit all covariates. This approach is conceptually similar to first differencing approaches in timeseries or panel models, except the index for time is replaced with an index for locations in space. The SFD design identifies plausibly causal effects, even when no instruments are available, so long as local changes in the treatment and unobservable confounders are not systematically correlated between immediately adjacent neighbors. We demonstrate the SFD approach by recovering new cross-sectional estimates for the effects of time-invariant geographic factors, soil and climate, on long-run average crop productivities across US counties — relationships that are notoriously confounded by unobservables but crucial for guiding economic decisions, such as land management and climate policy.

Analysis of projects generating 80% of total offset credits issued by ARB under its U.S. Forest projects offset protocol shows that 82% of the credits generated by these projects likely do not represent true emissions reductions, due to the protocol’s leakage accounting methods. The total quantity of over-crediting across these 36 projects equals approximately 80 million tons of CO2. For context, the U.S. Forest Protocol has generated 80% of the offset credits in California’s cap-and- trade program; the estimated over-crediting is equal to one third of the total expected effect of California’s cap-and-trade program on emissions during 2021-2030.

I investigate medium- and long-term impacts of the Great Recession on post-recession college graduates. Most so-called “scarring” models emphasize effects of initial conditions that attenuate over the first decade of a worker’s career. But early career recessions may also have permanent effects. I decompose the recent cohorts’ experience into transitory time effects, medium-term scarring, and permanent cohort effects. Cohort effects are strongly cyclical. Medium-term scarring explains only half of this cyclicality. The long-run cumulative effect of the recession on graduates’ employment is more than twice as large as the immediate effect.

I use data from a short, repetitive online game to explore the role of Flow Theory in motivation and game play. For each player, the Flow-Theory channel in which they are most likely to continue playing the game is identified, and players are categorized into types accordingly. Boredom and Relaxation types are most common. Flow types are among the least common, making up 11% of players. Flow types have the lowest skill level, but challenge themselves the most, and are most likely to make use of self-control devices available within the game. Control types play most frequently and over a longer period of weeks. Apathy types are high skill but seek out low challenges and are least likely to make use of self-control devices. Flow and control types are more likely to play during the workday. Relaxation, boredom and apathy types are more likely to play during workday evenings.

Accumulating evidence indicates that environmental temperature substantially affects economic outcomes and violence, but the reasons for this linkage are not well understood. We systematically evaluate the effect of thermal stress on multiple dimensions of economic decisionmaking, judgment, and destructive behavior with 2,000 participants in Kenya and the US who were randomly assigned to different temperatures in a laboratory. We find that most dimensions of decision-making are unaffected by temperature. However, heat causes individuals to voluntarily destroy other participants’ assets, with more pronounced effects during a period of heightened political conflict in Kenya.

Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is typically defined as an implementation of the potential Pareto criterion, which requires inclusion of any impact for which individuals have willingness to pay (WTP). But this definition is incompatible with the widely agreed upon exclusion of certain impacts such as rights and distributional concerns, because, as I demonstrate, individuals do have WTP for these impacts. I propose a new definition: BCA should include only those impacts for which we believe consumer sovereignty should govern. This definition is rooted in the observation that WTP, as a measure of value, implicitly preserves consumer sovereignty, and is thus only useful and appropriate for impacts for which that is what we desire. I propose a practical rule for implementing my definition in real-world BCA, based primarily on the contention that any rule should be biased against inclusion of impacts that should not be included, so-called type II error. I test my rule against some common impacts that, by consensus, are either included or not included, and include that in practical application it performs well.

Research shows that voters often use gender stereotypes to evaluate candidates, but studying how stereotyping affects women’s electoral chances raises a methodological problem: one can either measure stereotyping using surveys and experiments, or one can study outcomes of real elections—but not both. Most existing research does the former. We instead test whether patterns of women’s and men’s win rates in local elections match expectations for how the effects of gender stereotyping should vary: women should fare better in stereotype-congruent contexts and worse in incongruent contexts. Consistent with this, we find that women have a greater advantage in city council than mayoral races, a still greater advantage in school board races, and a decreasing advantage in more conservative constituencies. We also find the effects are largest where voters know less about local candidates. Thus, by studying real elections, we make progress toward understanding how voters affect women’s electoral success.

The genius of the Framers lay in identifying and systematically planning for the known pathologies of democratic government. That said, most of their evidence was limited to Greek and Roman history. This gave little warning of the disastrous polarization that would destabilize European mass democracies over the next two centuries. This paper asks how the Framers might have extended their design had they understood these dangers.

We start by noting that the well-known “median voter theorem,” which holds that successful American political parties must position themselves near the center, depends on very special assumptions about how public opinion is actually distributed. This implies that American politics can and probably will behave very differently as polarization increases. This paper presents a typology of possible polarizations, and argues from both theory and history that each is associated with its own unique political style. Significantly, only some of these styles favor consensus politics. Others are confrontational, with extremists deliberately sabotaging government to coerce opponents. Recent government shutdowns are an extreme expression of these tactics.

One peculiarity of coercive politics is that it depends at least as much on political passion (“intensity”) as raw vote totals. Asking whether such politics are democratically legitimate necessarily forces us beyond the familiar language of one-man-one-vote (“OMOV”) theories that count all votes equally. This philosophical question also has a practical side. After all, no real government can go on passing laws that increase public anger forever. The paper develops a simple baseline model of intensity-weighted voting and asks how familiar American rules like supermajorities, presidential vetoes, and filibusters have modified OMOV to avoid oppressive outcomes in the past. In doing so, we rely heavily on European historical precedents and ask how these might change in American circumstances.

We argue that coercive politics, while sometimes pathological, is an essential tool for measuring and accommodating voter intensity. It follows that reform should aim less to suppress coercive methods than to make them less costly. We argue that suitably reformed versions of government shutdowns, supermajorities, sunset legislation, regular order, and stiffened rule of law incentives offer the fastest path to restoring cooperative politics.